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ZONING ON HOLY GROUND: DEVELOPING A COHERENT 
FACTOR-BASED ANALYSIS FOR RLUIPA’S SUBSTANTIAL 
BURDEN PROVISION 
WRITTEN BY ANDREW WILLIS1
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Pastor Fred Fields bought a small, abandoned bait-and-tackle 
shop in the city of Markham, located on the south side of Chicago.2 The 
pastor intended to convert the building into a church for his thirty-person, 
African-American congregation.3 Upon seeking an occupancy permit from 
the city, a city official told Pastor Fields that Markham did not “need an-
other church” and that the city preferred that the property be used by a 
business in order to generate tax revenue.4 When the church applied for a 
conditional use permit, the city denied the application and told the church 
to revise the plan with blueprints and architectural plans.5 When a revised 
application was submitted, the city denied the application again, presenting 
new concerns and more requirements to gain approval.6 The process cost 
the small congregation $13,000 in legal and architectural fees and still left 
them without a permit.7 After the second denial of its application, the 
church filed a lawsuit against the city seeking injunctive relief.8
Stories like these prompted Congress to pass the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) in 2000.9 Religious organi-
zations can be unpopular occupants in zoning schemes. If a house of wor-
ship is located in a residential zone, the surrounding residents may 
 1.  J.D., cum laude, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.S. summa cum laude, Liberty University. I 
would like to thank Professor Sheldon Nahmod for his superb teaching of Constitutional Law, the 
attorneys at Mauck & Baker, LLC for introducing me to RLUIPA, and to the lovely Sarah Johnson for 
her patient editing. 
 2.  Mike Nolan, Parishioners ‘still standing’ after legal fight; Markham church celebrates 
opening, DAILY SOUTHTOWN (May 20, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-
southtown/news/ct-sta-markham-church-reopen-st-0521-story.html [https://perma.cc/JTB3-XUZN]. 
 3.  Id.
 4.  Id.
 5.  Id.
 6.  Id.
 7.  Id.
 8.  Id.
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complain of the accompanying traffic, noise, and decrease in property val-
ues.10 If a religious organization tries to locate in a commercial or business 
zone, land regulators have problems with the lack of tax revenue and com-
mercial attraction.11
Municipalities have been found to be hostile and discriminatory to re-
ligious organizations in whether they grant or deny the zoning applications 
and variances, particularly to those of minority religions.12 For example, in 
a three-year timespan, the Pew Research Center documented fifty-three 
proposed mosques and Islamic centers that encountered community re-
sistance.13 In many cases, the opposition centered on the usual concerns of 
neighbors: traffic, noise, and potential decreases in property values.14 In 
other communities, however, the controversies have centered on fears 
about Islam, Sharia law, and terrorism.15
Congress intended RLUIPA to solve the tension between the right to 
exercise religious beliefs and the interests behind zoning codes. RLUIPA 
prohibits land-use restrictions that impose a substantial burden on religious 
exercise, unless the government can satisfy a strict scrutiny test by demon-
strating that such a burden furthers a compelling government interest and is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.16 Strict scrutiny is the 
most demanding test in constitutional jurisprudence and usually a fatal 
blow for the government’s position.17 If a religious organization can suc-
cessfully litigate under RLUIPA, it is exempt from the land-use restriction, 
even if the restriction is otherwise generally applicable.18
Roughly three-quarters of Americans claim to be affiliated with a reli-
gion,19 and an estimated 350,000 religious congregations exist in the Unit-
 10.  Emma Green, The Quiet Religious-Freedom Fight That Is Remaking America, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/rluipa/543504/ 
[https://perma.cc/6T28-XMLE]. 
 11.  See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 373 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
 12.  See Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 13.  See Controversies Over Mosques and Islamic Centers Across the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Sep. 
27, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/09/27/controversies-over-mosques-and-islamic-centers-
across-the-u-s-2/ [https://perma.cc/N6DD-YD8L]. 
 14.  Id.
 15.  Id.
 16.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
 17.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scru-
tiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006). 
 18.  42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012). 
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ed States.20 RLUIPA claims can range from regulations on sewerage, to 
protecting historical buildings, to enforcing building capacity limits. If 
every land-use restriction were subject to strict scrutiny then thousands of 
real estate properties nationwide would escape zoning ordinances, envi-
ronmental protection rules, and urban planning schemes. To prevent this 
zoning Armageddon from taking place, RLUIPA requires that before strict 
scrutiny is satisfied, a religious organization must first show that the land-
use restriction constitutes a substantial burden on its religious exercise.21
What constitutes a substantial burden in religious land use? Despite 
being a common subject of litigation, the Supreme Court has yet to answer 
this question.22 The circuit courts, however, have developed a wide range 
of answers. Courts have struggled to uphold RLUIPA’s clear purpose—to 
relieve religious institutions of any land-use regulation that is unnecessarily 
restrictive—while at the same time ensuring that the substantial burden 
requirement is taken seriously so that religious organizations are not com-
pletely free from zoning restrictions.23
This Note’s purpose is to develop a clear yet flexible test to determine 
whether a land-use restriction constitutes a substantial burden on religious 
exercise. Part I will give a background to RLUIPA and the relevant Su-
preme Court cases used in defining a substantial burden, as well as intro-
duce the land-use provisions of RLUIPA itself. This part will also give a 
brief note on RLUIPA’s definition of free exercise and on the Act’s tension 
with the Establishment Clause. Part II will outline the different approaches 
the circuits have taken to define a substantial burden in the land-use con-
text. Part III will take the position that a factor-based approach offers the 
most certain, practical, and functional standard to define a substantial bur-
den. The Note will conclude with a list of factors courts should consider in 
their analysis and suggest ways to apply them in a land-use case. 
20.  Fast Facts About American Religion, HARTFORD INST. (Nov. 27, 2018) 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/research/fastfacts/fast_facts.html [https://perma.cc/PX9D-CZTQ]. 
 21.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 22.  In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to address a circuit split surrounding the test for 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision. Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington, Ohio, 139 S. 
Ct. 2011, 2012 (2019). 
 23.  Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. 
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I. THE HISTORY AND PROVISIONS OF RLUIPA
A.  Background of Substantial Burden Analysis and the Rise of 
RLUIPA 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”24 The First Amendment’s two 
religious clauses that came into existence in 1791. However, the first centu-
ry of the Free Exercise Clause’s existence saw few notable Supreme Court 
cases except for Reynolds v. United States, which involved a criminal in-
dictment against a leader of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
for practicing polygamy.25 The Court found that prohibiting the man’s reli-
gious duty to practice polygamy did not constitute a constitutional viola-
tion, drawing the distinction that his religious beliefs may be protected but 
not his religious conduct.26
It was not until the Warren Court in the 1960s that the Court conclud-
ed that the conduct and belief dichotomy imposed an unreasonable burden 
on religious conduct. In Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Brennan, writing for the 
Court, held that refusing to give state-sponsored unemployment benefits to 
a Seventh-day Adventist because of his refusal to work on his Saturday 
Sabbath constituted “a substantial infringement on religious liberties.”27
Forcing someone to choose between unemployment benefits and his reli-
gious beliefs imposes “the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of 
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday wor-
ship.”28 The Court then conducted a strict scrutiny analysis and found that 
the government did not have a compelling interest in denying unemploy-
ment benefits to the religious dissident.29
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that a compulsory attendance 
law that required Amish students to attend public high school until age 
sixteen violated the Free Exercise Clause and the parental right to direct the 
upbringing of one’s children.30 The Amish litigants successfully demon-
strated the intricate role their beliefs play in their daily lives and the need 
 24.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303-04 (1940) ([T]he [First] Amendment embraces two concepts—freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”). 
 26.  Id. at 164 (stating that “[c]ongress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, 
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order”). 
 27.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). 
 28.  Id. at 404. 
 29.  Id. at 409. 
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for adolescents to spend their formative years in the Amish environment.31
The Court found that forcing the children to attend high school “unduly 
burdens” the Amish people’s religious beliefs.32 The Court again used strict 
scrutiny and found that the state had to “show with more particularity” how 
accommodating the Amish would adversely affect their strong state interest 
in education.33 Thus, the Court ruled in favor of the Amish.34 With Sher-
bert and Yoder, strong precedent was in place to apply strict scrutiny to 
cases whenever the government imposed a substantial burden on religious 
exercise. 
But this precedent collapsed in 1990 upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith.35 In Smith, members of a Native American Church violated a 
criminal prohibition on hallucinogenic drugs by ingesting peyote as re-
quired by their religious beliefs.36 In contrast to Sherbert and Yoder, the 
Court did not apply strict scrutiny to the criminal prohibition, despite the 
burden on the litigants’ religious beliefs. Instead, the Court ruled that strict 
scrutiny analysis should not be applied in Free Exercise challenges to laws 
that were “generally applicable.”37 For laws that were neutral in effect, the 
Court would now look at Free Exercise challenges under a rational basis 
review. The Court said that holding otherwise “would be courting anar-
chy.”38 The Smith case radically altered the Free Exercise landscape, taking 
away the necessity for accommodating religious beliefs as long as the gov-
ernment could demonstrate that the law in question was generally applica-
ble. 
This decision was not well received by elected officials in the other 
two federal branches. In response, Congress attempted to reverse Smith and 
revive strict scrutiny protection against substantial burdens on religious 
exercise through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(“RFRA”).39 The attempted reversal of Smith was quickly squelched by the 
Supreme Court. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that RFRA ex-
ceeded congressional authority to enforce substantive free exercise rights 
 31.  Id. at 235-36. 
 32.  Id. at 220. 
 33.  Id. at 236. 
 34.  Id.
 35.  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 36.  Id. at 874.  
 37.  Id. at 882-83. 
 38.  Id. at 888. 
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against the states.40 The Court reasoned under the Fourteenth Amendment 
that Congress only has the authority to remedy constitutional violations, 
“not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”41
RFRA was not struck down entirely, however; as it still applies to federal 
laws.42
In response, Congress passed a narrower solution to Smith. RLUIPA 
reinstated strict scrutiny analysis for state and local laws that substantially 
burden religious conduct, but only in the context of institutionalized facili-
ties and land use. Congress found the need for the land-use legislation after 
compiling “massive evidence”—both statistical and anecdotal—that zoning 
codes frequently discriminated against religious groups seeking physical 
space to worship.43 In the course of nine hearings, Congress found that 
discrimination most often occurred toward new and small religious groups, 
particularly those of racial and religious minorities.44 RLUIPA passed with 
overwhelming, bipartisan support and President Clinton signed it into law 
on September 22, 2000. Surprisingly, since RLUIPA’s passage, the Su-
preme Court has never reviewed a case in the land-use context, although 
the Court has reviewed cases in the institutionalized-persons context.45
B. The Provisions of RLUIPA 
RLUIPA has two core provisions for land use. One provision prohibits 
civil authorities from treating religious institutions on less than equal terms 
than secular institutions in land-use regulation.46 Although this provision is 
not the focus of this Note, as will be shown in Part II, some courts have 
used the Equal Terms provision to interpret its sister provision: the substan-
 40.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997). 
 41.  Id. at 519. 
 42.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  
 43.  146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
 44.  See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18-24 (1999) (These hearings concerned a broader bill, the 
proposed Religious Liberty Protection Act, that never passed. RLUIPA was selected from this proposed 
piece of legislation and presented as its own individual bill.). 
 45.  See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 857 (2015) (holding that a substantial burden existed when 
a prison forbade a Muslim prisoner from growing a beard of a certain length, which the prisoner sin-
cerely believed was required by his religion. However, the Court did not define a substantial burden). 
 46.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). Interestingly, the statutory language only applies strict scruti-
ny to generally applicable laws that come into the reach of the tax and power and commerce clause 
prongs. The effect of the Fourteenth Amendment prong is only to “individualized assessments.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc. This has caused some commentators to argue that RLUIPA’s substantial burden 
provision should not apply to generally applicable laws. Instead, a substantial burden should only be 
considered at all when applying to individualized assessments that indicate an element of arbitrary and 
capricious decision making by government officials. See Adam J. MacLeod, Resurrecting the Bogey-
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tial burden provision. This second part of RLUIPA, the subject of this 
Note, states, 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 
person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the govern-
ment demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assem-
bly, or institution— 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental  
interest; and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that  
compelling governmental interest.47
RLUIPA intentionally does not define “substantial burden.” In a con-
gressional joint statement in enacting RLUIPA, the bill’s co-sponsors stat-
ed, 
The Act does not include a definition of the term ‘substantial burden’  
because it is not the intent of this Act to create a new standard for the 
definition of ‘substantial burden’ on religious exercise. Instead, that term 
as used in the Act should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.48
The co-sponsors further stated, “The term ‘substantial burden’ as used 
in this Act is not intended to be given any broader interpretation than the 
Supreme Court’s articulation of the concept of substantial burden or reli-
gious exercise.”49
The Act specifies that the other terms of RLUIPA are to be construed 
broadly to the maximum extent as allowed by its terms and the Constitu-
tion.50 For its constitutional basis, Congress rests its authority for passing 
RLIUPA in three constitutional provisions: the tax and spending power, the 
commerce clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process provision. 
Thus, RLUIPA specifies that its substantial burden analysis applies only 
when (1) the land-use regulation is in connection with activity that receives 
federal funds; (2) the land-use regulation affects interstate commerce or 
Indian tribes; or (3) the burden occurs in the context of applying a land-use 
regulation where the government makes “individualized assessments” re-
garding the property involved.51 Similar to RFRA in City of Boerne, there 
 47.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 48.  146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
 49.  Id.
 50.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2012). 
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was originally skepticism about whether this provision exceeds Congress’s 
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but so far the 
courts have rejected this argument.52
C. A Digression on Religious Exercise 
Any discussion of what constitutes a substantial burden would not be 
complete without a brief reference to another RLUIPA term, “religious 
exercise.”53 Even if a substantial burden can be shown, RLUIPA protec-
tions do not apply to merely any religious activity. Many religious institu-
tions operate places of commerce out of their buildings, like coffee shops 
or bookstores, both of which may be considered part of their religious ac-
tivity. 
Unlike the term “substantial burden,” RLUIPA does not use Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in defining religious exercise.54 Congress specified 
that only certain types of religious activity are within the scope of the Act. 
The Act itself defines religious exercise in general as “any exercise of reli-
gion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious be-
lief.”55 Furthermore, the rule in RLUIPA is that “[t]he use, building, or 
conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be 
considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or in-
tends to use the property for that purpose.”56 To offer clarity behind the 
term, a joint congressional statement discussing RLUIPA states that “not 
every activity carried out by a religious entity or individual constitutes 
‘religious exercise.’”57 For example, “a burden on a commercial building, 
which is connected to religious exercise primarily by the fact that the pro-
ceeds from the building’s operation would be used to support religious 
exercise, is not a substantial burden on ‘religious exercise.’”58
This is illustrated by a financially struggling Christian Science church 
in New York that leased its building to a catering business in order to cover 
its bills.59 The lease gave the catering business almost complete control of 
the building except the church retained the right to utilize certain rooms of 
the building for services on Sundays, Wednesday evenings, and certain 
 52.  Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 53.  See generally Jason Z. Pesick, RLUIPA: What’s the Use, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 359 (2012). 
 54.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7) (2000). 
 55.  Id.
 56.  Id.
 57.  146 CONG. REC. 16,700 (2000). 
 58.  Id.
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holidays.60 The city said that the lease could not be added to its original 
zoning permit and denied the business’ use of the facility, which led the 
church to sue under RLUIPA.61 The District Court noted that a burden on 
catering within a church building is not a burden on religious exercise with-
in the meaning of RLUIPA, even if the church benefits financially from the 
catering business.62
 D. A Violation of the Establishment Clause? 
RLUIPA is rooted in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and is there-
fore aimed at protecting religious practice from intrusive state interference. 
Precautions must be taken, however, to ensure the other religion clause of 
the First Amendment is not encroached upon. The Establishment Clause is 
aimed at protecting the government’s decision-making from religion.63 As 
a legislative accommodation of religion, RLUIPA occupies a tense area 
between the Free Exercise Clause, which assures that the government does 
not interfere with religious exercise, and the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits the government from becoming too entangled with religion in a 
way that favors a certain religion over other religions or non-religion.64
Thus, one precaution that courts evaluating a RLUIPA claim must consider 
is whether the government is treating religious institutions too favorably in 
their zoning laws, especially in relation to other land-users.65
RLUIPA has been criticized as a wholesale religious exemption for 
land-use regulations—a tool for religious institutions to escape land-use 
regulations that every other landowner must comply with.66 The law has 
also been seen as unduly hampering the careful planning efforts of local 
governments.67 However, so far, an Establishment Clause attack on 
RLUIPA has not gained much traction. The Seventh Circuit has not ex-
pressed concern with RLUIPA being too favorable to religious entities. In 
response to Establishment Clause concerns, Petra Presbyterian Church v. 
Village of Northbrook emphasized religious plaintiffs’ vulnerability to dis-
 60.  Id.
 61.  Id. at 207. 
 62.  Id. at 209. 
 63.  See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785). 
 64.  See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 65.  See Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 
895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 66.  Adam J. MacLeod, Resurrecting the Bogeyman: The Curious Forms of the Substantial Bur-
den Test in RLUIPA, REAL EST. L.J. 115, 127 (2011). 
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crimination by zoning boards, especially congregations who are not affili-
ated with large, mainstream denominations like the Roman Catholic 
Church.68
The Second Circuit found the statute’s land-use provision complied 
with the three-pronged Lemon test.69 The Second Circuit in Westchester 
Day School  v. Village of Mamaroneck found that the first prong of the 
Lemon test is satisfied since RLUIPA has a secular purpose—”to lift gov-
ernment-created burdens on private religious exercise.”70 Under the second 
Lemon prong, the court found that the principal or primary effect of 
RLUIPA’s land-use provisions neither advances nor inhibits religion; it 
only permits the practice of religious beliefs without an unnecessary gov-
ernment burden. “RLUIPA cannot be said to advance religion simply by 
requiring that states not discriminate against or among religious institu-
tions.”71 Finally, when examining the third Lemon prong the court found 
that RLUIPA’s land-use provisions did not foster excessive government 
entanglement with religion.72 The Second Circuit did note that the Estab-
lishment Clause limits RLUIPA from being so broadly construed that it 
would grant a religious institution immunity from land-use regulation.73
Such immunity would put a religious institution in too favorable of a posi-
tion over non-religious and other religious entities.74
II. ADAPTING SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN ANALYSIS TO RELIGIOUS   
LAND-USE
When Congress passed RLUIPA in 2000, commentators criticized the 
Act as being overbroad and ripe for abuse, fearing that religious institutions 
would use the law as a means to get around land-use regulations.75 Howev-
er, those fears have largely not come to fruition. The courts have been care-
ful to interpret RLUIPA’s provisions narrowly. With RLUIPA leaving its 
definition of “substantial burden” to Supreme Court precedent and the Su-
preme Court offering no specific guidance in the land-use context,76 the 
 68.  Id.
 69.  See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 355 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 70.  Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (RLUIPA prisoner Supreme Court 
case)). 
 71.  Id. at 355-56. 
 72.  Id. at 355. 
 73.  See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 74.  Id.
 75.  See generally Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications and 
Troubling Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805 (2006). 
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circuit courts have been left to their own devices to determine what consti-
tutes a substantial burden. Courts have uniformly agreed that not just any 
imposition on religious exercise constitutes a RLUIPA violation, but they 
have taken varying positions as to what conduct violates the Act.77 The 
result has been a plethora of tests, definitions, and factors in defining a 
substantial burden, with differing results. This section outlines the three 
approaches taken by the circuits: the “effectively impracticable” approach, 
the direct coercion approach, and the factor-based approach. 
A. Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ “Effectively Impracticable” Standard 
The Seventh Circuit was one of the first to offer a definition of “sub-
stantial burden,” coming up with a high standard for plaintiffs to overcome. 
In C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, a group of churches and a church associa-
tion argued that the city of Chicago’s requirement that the churches obtain 
a “Special Use” approval to move into business and certain commercial 
zoning districts constituted a substantial burden under RLUIPA.78 The 
churches had continually applied for and were denied approval by the city, 
and costs ran up to $5,000 per application.79
The court rejected the argument that these barriers constituted a sub-
stantial burden, opting to define the term narrowly: “[A] substantial burden 
on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fun-
damental responsibility for rendering religious exercise-including the use 
of real property for the purpose thereof . . . effectively impracticable.”80
The court stated that factors like the scarcity of affordable land, procedural 
requirements, and the inherently political aspects of obtaining zoning vari-
ances are merely “incidental” and do not constitute a substantial burden.81
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit defined “substantial burden” in a way 
that was “entirely consistent” with the Seventh Circuit’s standard.82 The 
court held in San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, that for a 
land-use regulation to impose a “substantial burden,” it must be “oppres-
sive” to a “significantly great” extent.83 Since a municipality’s environmen-
tal regulations and application requirements on a private Christian college 
 77.  See Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996, 1003 (6th Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1696 (2018) (“One principle that clearly emerges from . . . our sister circuits’ 
decisions is that not just any imposition on religious exercise will constitute a violation of RLUIPA.”). 
 78.  Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 755-58 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 79.  See id. at 755-57. 
 80.  Id. at 761. 
 81.  Id.
 82.  San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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did not “render religious exercise effectively impracticable,” only more 
expensive and inconvenient, no substantial burden existed.84
In some ways, this “effectively impracticable” approach only adds an 
extra level to the substantial burden analysis; now the question becomes, 
what does “effectively impracticable” look like? Seventh Circuit cases 
have since offered clarity and in some ways retreated from its initially nar-
row definition. First, the Seventh Circuit made it clear that a substantial 
burden must “mean something different from greater burden than imposed 
on secular institutions.”85 Unequal burdens are explicitly prohibited in 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision. 
A second point that has been cleared up is that “effectively impracti-
cable” does not necessarily mean that religious institutions do not have 
alternative locations to carry out their religious practices. However, lacking 
an alternative location for a house of worship is a strong indicator of a sub-
stantial burden. In Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church v. 
City of New Berlin, the Seventh Circuit found that a substantial burden 
existed for a church that had acquired land to build a church and sought the 
appropriate rezoning measure.86 The municipality denied the church’s ap-
plication for fear that the church would eventually sell the property for 
something other than religious use, despite the church agreeing to condition 
the rezoning only for its stated purpose.87 Judge Posner found that the 
city’s actions constituted a substantial burden on the church’s religious 
exercise, saying that the church’s conditional rezoning agreement should 
alleviate the city’s fear.88 Posner agreed that the church could have found 
an alternative property or continued applying for a permit, but doing so 
would cause “delay, uncertainty, and expense.”89
Finally, the Seventh Circuit has made it clear that a religious organiza-
tion must have a reasonable expectation that its requested land-use will be 
accepted. In Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, the 
church bought the land with every indication by the governing authority 
that its request would be granted.90 However, in Petra Presbyterian Church
v. Village of Northbrook, a church bought a property in an industrial zone 
 84.  Id. at 1035. 
 85.  Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 
900 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 86.  See id. at 901. 
 87.  Id. at 898. 
 88.  Id. at 901. 
 89.  Id.
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and had advance warning that their permit would not be granted.91 When 
the church proceeded to purchase the property anyway, it did not have a 
substantial burden claim because the church did not have any reasonable 
expectation that its application would be approved.92
B. The Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits’ “Direct Coercion” 
 Approach 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have opted to define “substantial 
burden” as a government regulation that “directly coerces” a religious or-
ganization to change its religious behavior.93 This approach focuses on 
whether a plaintiff’s behavior in their religious exercise must be modified 
to comply with a land-use restriction. This comes in contrast to the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuit’s “effectively impracticable” approach, which focuses on 
the likely possibility that the religious institution can function at all on the 
property. 
In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, Jewish synagogues 
were denied a zoning variance and special-use permit to locate in the Flori-
da town’s business district.94 The town zoning code allowed religious or-
ganizations to locate in only one of eight zoning districts.95 The 
congregation of Orthodox Jews did not use cars or other types of motorized 
transportation on the Sabbath.96 The congregation argued that the zoning 
restrictions, which took the synagogue out of walking distance, imposed a 
substantial burden on their religious exercise.97
The Eleventh Circuit declined to implement the “effectively impracti-
cable” standard of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.98 Instead, the court rea-
soned that “the relevant inquiry is whether and to what extent this 
particular requirement burdens the congregations’ religious exercise.”99
The court found a substantial burden as being “akin to significant pressure 
which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior 
accordingly.”100 Thus, the court looked at whether the pressure from the 
land regulation “tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts or 
 91.  See Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 92.  Id. at 851. 
 93.  See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 94.  Id. at 1220. 
 95.  Id. at 1219. 
 96.  Id. at 1221. 
 97.  Id. at 1227. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 1228. 
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from pressure that mandates religious conduct.”101 For the Jewish congre-
gation, the court said that while walking a few extra blocks to the syna-
gogue in the Floridian heat may be more difficult, particularly for older 
congregants, this did not make their burden “substantial.”102
The Fourth Circuit also adopted a similar approach. The court rea-
soned that land-use regulations do not compel plaintiffs to “violate their 
beliefs” in the same way prison rules may require an inmate to violate his 
or her religious tenets.103 The government does not have “absolute control” 
over religious institutions in the land-use context and will “rarely” force a 
religious institution to violate its beliefs.104 However, a land-use restriction 
may prohibit a plaintiff from acting in accordance with their religious be-
liefs. Thus, “in the land use context, a plaintiff can succeed on a substantial 
burden claim by establishing that a government regulation puts substantial 
pressure on it to modify its behavior.”105
The Second Circuit also adopted the directly coercive approach but at-
tempted to be more pragmatic by spelling out several factors of what direct 
coercion on religious exercise looks like.106 Neutral application of a land-
use restriction is likely not a substantial burden, especially if it is related to 
“reasonable ‘run of the mill’ zoning considerations.”107 In contrast, where 
the law is imposed in an arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful manner, there is 
strong indication of a substantial burden.108 The court noted two other indi-
cators: “(1) whether there are quick, reliable, and financially feasible alter-
natives [the plaintiff] may utilize to meet [their] religious needs absent 
[their] obtaining the construction permit; and (2) whether the denial [of the 
application] was conditional.”109 If there are alternatives and the denial is 
not absolute, it is less likely a substantial burden exists. 
C. The Dawn of the Factor-Based Analysis 
In recent years, the circuit courts that had not previously defined “sub-
stantial burden” have decided against the “effectively impracticable” or 
“directly coercive” standards. These approaches were criticized as being 
 101.  Id.
 102.  Id. at 1228. 
 103.  Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 555 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
 104.  Id.
 105.  Id. at 556. 
 106.  Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 107.  Id. at 350 (quoting Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227-28 & n.11).  
 108.  Id.
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“abstract formulations” that have produced inconsistent results.110 Instead, 
these circuits have opted for a “functional approach,” specifying certain 
verifiable factors that indicate a substantial burden.111
The First Circuit was the first to use a factor-based test, choosing to 
focus on the land-use regulators’ bias against religious institutions. In Ro-
man Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, the court consid-
ered three factors in evaluating a substantial burden claim: (1) whether the 
land restriction “appears to target a religion, religious practice, or members 
of a religious organization because of hostility to that religion itself”; (2) 
“whether local regulators have subjected the religious organization to a 
process that may appear neutral on its face but in practice is designed to 
reach a predetermined outcome contrary to the group’s request”; and 
(3) ”whether the land use restriction was imposed on the religious institu-
tion arbitrarily, capriciously or unlawfully.”112 The case involved a building 
that was designated a historical landmark after the church had bought it to 
demolish the building and construct a new facility. Despite such signs that 
the landmark designation was motivated by bias against the church, the 
court ultimately rejected the substantial burden claim. The court found that 
the possible religious bias in the decision-making process was not outcome 
determinative.113
The Sixth Circuit has also sought to identify factors in considering 
what constitutes a substantial burden; however, it has focused on the out-
come of the land-use regulation as opposed to the decision-making process. 
In Livingston Christian School v. Genoa Charter Township, a Michigan 
nondenominational Christian school attempted to relocate from a neighbor-
ing municipality to Genoa Township.114 The school had entered into a lease 
agreement with a church in Genoa Township so that the school could oper-
ate on the church’s property.115 However, after the lease was signed, the 
township informed the school that an amended special-use permit would be 
required before it could use the church’s property.116 When the church ap-
plied for a permit on behalf of the school, it was denied by the township.117
 110.  Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 95 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 111.  Id.
 112.  Id. at 96-97 (internal quotations omitted). 
 113.  Id. at 99. 
 114.  Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996, 998 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1696 (2018). 
 115.  Id. at 999. 
 116.  Id.
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The school then filed a complaint alleging that denying the special-use 
permit violated RLUIPA.118
The court considered three factors: (1) “whether the religious institu-
tion has a feasible alternative location from which it can carry on its mis-
sion”; (2) “whether the religious institution will suffer substantial ‘delay, 
uncertainty, and expense’ due to the imposition of the regulation”; and (3) 
whether “a plaintiff has imposed a burden upon itself,” such as when “an 
institutional plaintiff has obtained an interest in land without a reasonable 
expectation of being able to use that land for religious purposes.”119 The 
court found that under these factors the religious school did not suffer a 
substantial burden, largely because another facility suited the school’s 
needs in a nearby township.120
III. CREATING A COHERENT FACTOR-BASED SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
TEST
This Note takes the position that a factor-based analysis should be the 
mainstay in substantial burden analysis. By considering a variety of con-
crete verifiable facts that are common to substantial burdens on religious 
exercise, this approach offers the most clarity, flexibility, and certainty of 
the three tests so far suggested. It also allows the courts to tailor its ap-
proach to the facts of the particular case. The other two approaches put 
forth by the courts, the “effectively impracticable” and “directly coercive” 
standards, are problematic because they are too abstract and narrow the 
meaning of “substantial burden.” 
The effectively impracticable approach is flawed for placing too much 
emphasis on the term “substantial.” To meet this standard, religious plain-
tiffs must show that land restrictions are the direct and primary cause for 
rendering their religious exercise “effectively impracticable.”121 This ap-
proach forces plaintiffs to prove that the land-use restriction is not just sub-
stantially burdensome but debilitating as well. The interpretation gives little 
relief to organizations that may face discrimination yet still have some 
possible means to carry out their religious exercise. As the First Circuit 
points out, “substantial” describes something of significant weight or force, 
but not necessarily to the point that the weight is disabling.122 The approach 
also goes against the clear language of RLUIPA, which intentionally con-
 118.  Id.
 119.  Id. at 1004. 
 120.  Id. at 1011. 
 121.  Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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strues its terms as broadly as the terms and the Constitution allow.123 Limit-
ing the substantial burden provision only to cases where religious exercise 
is effectively impracticable narrows RLUIPA’s reach dramatically. 
This unwieldy approach may also present unfair challenges to regula-
tors. As the Sixth Circuit points out, the standard “would mean that, any 
time a land-use regulation completely barred the religious use of a proper-
ty, a substantial burden would automatically exist.”124 An automatic sub-
stantial burden would leave a zoning authority without an opportunity to 
demonstrate the reasons behind its plan. 
The directly coercive approach is not as narrow as the effectively im-
practicable standard but still has similar problems. First, the approach is 
singular in focus, centering only on the impact of the government decision 
on religious exercise. It does not allow the courts to consider the reasonable 
expectations of a certain religious organization when it bought a property. 
A congregation could buy a property with every indication from the gov-
erning authority that its use would be approved but then be denied later due 
to an arbitrary government decision. Under the directly coercive approach, 
if an alternative location is available, a substantial burden does not exist 
since their religious exercise is not being coerced. A second problem is that 
the approach does not take into account the possibility of unseen discrimi-
nation that will be discussed below in the section titled “Improper Decision 
Making.” 
In comparison to the other two approaches, a factor-based analysis of-
fers the most clarity, flexibility, and certainty to district courts, litigants, 
municipalities, and religious institutions in determining whether ligation is 
necessary. Parties are more likely to disagree over abstract formulations 
than over concrete factors, and hence produce more lawsuits. Instead of 
litigating over vague questions of what is effectively impracticable or di-
rectly coercive, a factor-based analysis allows parties to consider the factu-
al circumstances, like the availability of alternative locations, to determine 
whether a substantial burden exists. 
The following are factors courts can use in considering whether a sub-
stantial burden exists on religious exercise from a land-use restriction. This 
list is not comprehensive and should be left open for other factors to be 
developed by the courts as the needs of religious organizations change or 
become more cognizant. No factor discussed below should be considered 
 123.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3 (2012). 
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dispositive by itself, and the weight given to a particular factor may vary 
depending on the situation. 
A. The Availability of Alternative Means or Locations 
One widely cited factor is whether there are other available locations 
or means the religious plaintiffs can use to practice their faith. If there are 
no alternative means or locations available to a plaintiff to practice their 
faith, then there is a strong likelihood that a substantial burden exists.125
This may mean that a religious congregation can be completely prohibited 
from building on their own land but that other ways to carry out their wor-
ship are still available.126 The principle seems straightforward on its face, 
but the jurisprudence surrounding this factor has shown the need for more 
specificity and nuance. 
One point of contention is whether there should be a hardline rule that 
a governing body must have locations available in its jurisdiction for a 
religious institution to meet. Free Exercise jurisprudence has generally 
established that if a municipality refuses to allow a religious institution to 
establish a place that meets its needs and there is no other available location 
in its jurisdiction that does not suffer from similar regulation issues, reli-
gious exercise is substantially burdened.127 This principle is backed by the 
Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA, which explicitly prohibits a govern-
ment from imposing a regulation that “totally excludes religious assemblies 
from a jurisdiction” or “unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institu-
tions, or structures within a jurisdiction.”128
However, the practicality of enforcing such a hardline rule, particular-
ly in small jurisdictions, has caused courts to take a factual and functional 
approach, as a factor-based approach provides. For example, in Livingston,
 125.  The U.S. Supreme Court previously ruled on the importance of a zoning scheme leaving 
available alternative locations in the First Amendment context. In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
owners of a live entertainment venue with nude dancers were subject to criminal penalties under an 
ordinance that prohibited all live entertainment in the entire Borough of Mount Ephraim. The Supreme 
Court held that free expression protections require that the zoning scheme’s time, place, and manner 
restrictions must leave open adequate alternative means, and reversed the appellate court’s ruling 
against the venue owners. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981). 
 126.  Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 127.  See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of N.Y., 293 F.3d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 2002) (alt-
hough RLUIPA was not argued, the court still found a substantial burden on First Amendment rights 
when the municipality refused to allow outdoor sanctuary for the homeless to sleep when no other 
options were available); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d at 349 (“[w]hen the 
[religious] school has no ready alternatives, or where the alternatives require substantial ‘delay, uncer-
tainty, and expense,’ a complete denial of the school’s application might be indicative of a substantial 
burden.”). 
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the religious school only had one available location in the township, and 
the closest alternative was twelve miles away in a different jurisdiction.129
The court noted the township’s relatively small size (roughly thirty square 
miles) and that local government jurisdictions are often arbitrarily 
drawn.130 “Holding that a religious institution is substantially burdened any 
time that it cannot locate within such a small area . . . would be tantamount 
to giving religious institutions a free pass from zoning laws.”131 The court 
found that there could not be a substantial burden simply because there 
were no locations available in the township. Requiring the school children 
to drive an extra twelve miles to get to the alternative location would not be 
substantially burdensome, only “a mere inconvenience.”132 The flexibility 
of the factor-based analysis allowed the court to come to such a reasonable 
conclusion. If a jurisdiction is large, a stricter rule may be appropriate. But 
in the case of small townships, considering alternatives in other townships 
can be allowed. 
Note that the availability of other locations does not allow a governing 
body to prohibit a house of worship if the religious institution purchased 
the property with a reasonable expectation that religious use would be per-
mitted. Courts have looked at the availability of alternative locations both 
when disputed properties were originally purchased as well as when their 
applications were denied by regulating authorities.133 In a case involving a 
property in a historic preservation district, the Second Circuit remanded the 
case back to the district court to determine whether a Jewish congregation 
had alternative locations available at the time of purchase, and whether the 
congregation reasonably believed they would be permitted to undertake the 
proposed modifications to the property at the time of purchase.134 In addi-
tion, courts are more likely to disregard the availability of alternative loca-
tions if the religious organization in question has to go undergo the “delay, 
uncertainty, and expense of selling the plaintiff’s property and finding an 
alternate location.”135
The “available alternatives” factor is not limited to a lack of alterna-
tive properties. It can also mean that in the application process, there is a 
 129.  Livingston Christian Sch., 858 F.3d at 1005. 
 130.  Id. at 1011. 
 131.  Id. at 1010-11. 
 132.  Id. at 1009. 
 133.  Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 134.  Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 
196 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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lack of alternative means to meet the government’s requirements. This is 
often an issue when a religious organization already owns and uses a prop-
erty but is seeking a modification to their permit. However, to argue that an 
application process leaves a religious organization with no alternatives, the 
plaintiff may have to show that they attempted to use the alternative means 
available but failed. For example, a Missouri religious homeless shelter 
complained that it had no alternative means when the municipality required 
it to collect signatures from neighboring residents, who previously signed a 
petition asking that the shelter’s permit be revoked, in order to approve the 
zoning permit.136 The court found that alternatives means did exist because 
the shelter did not attempt to collect the signatures for the petition, and the 
neighbors’ attitudes toward the shelter may have changed.137
A lack of alternative locations or means is a compelling factor in sub-
stantial burden analysis, but its weight will vary depending on the facts of 
the case. In summary, here are some considerations courts can use in 
weighing the lack of available alternatives for the plaintiffs: whether the 
religious organization has ready alternatives within the jurisdiction or rea-
sonably close surrounding areas; whether the alternatives require substan-
tial delay, uncertainty, or expense; whether the alternative locations could 
be reasonably expected to meet the land regulation’s requirements; and, in 
the case of a conditional denial of an application, whether the religious 
organization has sought out alternative means to fulfill the authority’s re-
quirements without compromising their own faith tenets.138
B. Improper Decision Making 
One factor that has been the strongest point of dispute among the cir-
cuit courts is considering evidence of wrongful decision making on the part 
of the civil authority. The argument goes that when a municipality’s actions 
are arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or taken in bad faith, a substantial bur-
den may exist, because it appears that the applicant may have been discrim-
inated against on the basis of their status as a religious institution.139 For 
example, in Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, the court found that in deny-
ing the church’s application, the town attempted to extort a payment in lieu 
of taxes from the church, ignored and then replaced their planning commis-
sioner when he advocated on the church’s behalf, and intentionally de-
 136.  New Life Evangelistic Ctr. v. City of St. Louis, 564 S.W.3d 665, 683 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 
2018), transfer denied (Nov. 5, 2018). 
 137.  Id. at 684. 
 138.  Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 349. 
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stroyed relevant evidence.140 The court also found the municipality’s rea-
sons for forcing the church to reapply to be disingenuous.141 This evidence 
indicated hostility toward the church, and the court found that there was a 
substantial burden.142
Yet this factor has been rejected by several circuits. In Livingston, the 
Sixth Circuit rejected evidence of improper decision making for two rea-
sons.143 First, the court argued that evidence of arbitrary, capricious, or 
discriminatory application of the law should only be considered in applying 
strict scrutiny, which occurs after a substantial burden is found,144 and 
pointed out that several sister courts have confused and intermixed the two 
doctrines.145 The court did not give a reason why improper decision making 
cannot be considered in both substantial burden analysis and strict scrutiny. 
It is true that some courts have confused strict scrutiny with substantial 
burden analysis. For example, in Fortress Bible Church, the court found 
the “compelling governmental interests” put forth by the town to be disin-
genuous and used this finding to conclude that a substantial burden ex-
ists.146 This is a backwards RLUIPA analysis—the application of strict 
scrutiny is conditioned on finding a substantial burden. However, other 
courts’ misapplication of RLUIPA is hardly reason for excluding improper 
decision making from one’s own analysis, particularly in light of the dis-
crimination concerns that will be discussed next. 
The second and more compelling reason the Livingston court gave for 
excluding improper decision making was that RLUIPA already contained a 
prohibition on discrimination, spelled out in subsection (b)—the Equal 
Terms provision.147 The court argued that allowing evidence of discrimina-
tion in substantial burden analysis would render the Equal Terms provision 
“superfluous.”148
It first should be pointed out that inclusion of improper decision mak-
ing in considering equal treatment does not necessarily exclude it from 
being considered in substantial burden analysis. But the stronger reason for 
 140.  Id.
 141.  Id.
 142.  Id.
 143.  Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996, 1004-05 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 144.  Id.
 145.  Id.
 146.  Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 147.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)(2) (2012). 
 148.  Livingston Christian Sch., 858 F.3d at 1005; Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgom-
ery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Requiring a religious institution to show that it 
has been targeted on the basis of religion in order to succeed on a substantial burden claim would render 
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including improper decision making as a factor is to bolster RLUIPA’s 
main policy concern of prohibiting religious bias in land-use regulation. As 
the Seventh Circuit pointed out, considering arbitrary, capricious, or dis-
criminatory decision-making “backstops the explicit prohibition of reli-
gious discrimination in” RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision.149 A strong 
policy reason for the substantial burden test is to protect religious institu-
tions from “subtle forms of discrimination.”150
Subtle forms of discrimination may be especially prevalent in zoning 
decisions because they are often based on individualized assessments. As 
the Seventh Circuit points out, the task of granting or denying a zoning 
application is often left “to nonprofessionals operating without procedural 
safeguards” and acting with “standardless discretion.”151 Here the court is 
referring to elected officials or appointed zoning board members making 
mostly arbitrary assessments of the applicants, such as in deciding whether 
or not to grant zoning variances. This leaves more room for subtle forms of 
discrimination. In contrast, if the government is simply applying a general-
ly applicable law that does not leave room for discretion, it is less likely 
discrimination played a role in the decision. It follows that if a land regula-
tion is imposed based on an individualized assessment of a governing au-
thority, as opposed to a generally applicable law, there is a stronger 
inference that a substantial burden exists.152
Unexpressed discrimination is a particularly relevant concern for 
small religious groups. The Seventh Circuit has pointed out the “vulnerabil-
ity of religious institutions . . . to subtle forms of discrimination” in going 
before zoning boards, especially those that are not affiliated with main-
stream denominations, like the Roman Catholic Church.153 Such congrega-
tions do not have the political clout or large enough budgets to defend 
themselves in court. The Supreme Court itself expressed concern that reli-
gious minorities may be prone to religious hostility even under the guise of 
neutral laws in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hiale-
ah.154
The Seventh Circuit analogizes the relationship between the Substan-
tial Burden and Equal Terms provisions as acting in the same way as “the 
 149.  Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 
900 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 150.  Id.
 151.  Id.; see also Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 152.  Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 
196 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 153.  Id.
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disparate-impact theory of employment discrimination backstops the prohi-
bition of intentional discrimination.”155 “Disparate impact theory” refers to 
the concept in employment law in which explicit discrimination does not 
need to be shown as long as it is proven that the actions disproportionately 
affect a protected trait. This allows a plaintiff to prevail by establishing a 
policy or practice that affects members of the protected group so dispropor-
tionately that courts can infer discrimination from the impact.156 An em-
ployee can present a strong likelihood of discrimination without explicit 
evidence. In the same way, the substantial burden provision allows courts 
to consider all the factual circumstances in determining whether there is 
religious discrimination, even without expressed intent to discriminate. 
This allows the courts to sniff out subtle discrimination that would other-
wise escape the analysis of the explicit prohibition of discrimination in the 
Equal Terms clause. The Seventh Circuit argued that if a land-use decision, 
such as denying a zoning variance, imposes a substantial burden on reli-
gious exercise and the decision maker cannot justify it, there is an inference 
that the decision was influenced by hostility to religion.157
Squelching discrimination and bias against religious property owners 
was one of the original policy purposes behind RLUIPA. The Congression-
al Record in passing RLUIPA shows a strong motivation for expelling 
religious hostility from land-use authorities.158 Removing improper dis-
crimination from substantial burden analysis hinders this purpose. Such 
evidence acts as a signal that a religious organization is experiencing un-
warranted difficulty, giving notice to a court of a probable substantial bur-
den on religious exercise. Take the example of Pastor Fred Fields (from 
this Note’s introductory paragraph), who was told by city officials that his 
church was not wanted on the property he had bought. By including the 
city official’s statements in its arguments for proving a substantial burden, 
Pastor Fields could demonstrate that its trouble in gaining a permit was not 
due to normal administrative costs and delays. Establishing a substantial 
burden is a necessary step in order to reach strict scrutiny. If the city’s ex-
pressions of discrimination were excluded from the substantial burden 
analysis, it is probable that Pastor Fields would never have been able to 
introduce the evidence to the court under the substantial burden provision. 
 155.  Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc., 396 F.3d at 900. 
 156.  See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This is usually established 
statistically by showing the alleged discrimination happens 80% of the time. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) 
(1978). 
 157.  Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc., 396 F.3d at 900. 
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An overview of the caselaw on this point has indicated common facts 
that demonstrate signs of subtle forms of discrimination. The following are 
suggested factors for substantial burden analysis that indicate improper 
decision making on the part of the regulator: whether the land regulation 
appears to target a religion, religious practice, or members of a religious 
organization because of hostility to that religion itself;159 whether local 
regulators have subjected the religious organization to a process that may 
appear neutral on its face but in practice is designed to reach a predeter-
mined outcome contrary to the group’s request;160 whether the authority 
has demonstrated an unwillingness to deliberate over the religious organi-
zation’s application;161 and whether the regulators have repeatedly denied 
permits despite the plaintiff’s willingness to cooperate and compromise.162
C. Substantial Delay, Uncertainty, and Expense 
Religious organizations often have small budgets, and also cannot be 
expected to delay their religious practice for long periods of time. Factoring 
the financial impact, delay, and uncertainty involved in the land-use regula-
tion allows the court to ensure the religious organization is not subjected to 
unreasonable costs. The issue lies in striking the right balance between a 
substantial delay or expense and what is only “incidental” or a “mere in-
convenience.”163
Surprisingly, so far in RLUIPA jurisprudence, courts have largely ex-
cluded the financial impact that land-use regulations have on religious or-
ganizations in their substantial burden analysis. The Seventh Circuit has 
held that the scarcity of affordable land is only an incidental burden on 
religious exercise.164 According to the Fourth Circuit, “[t]he absence of 
affordable and available properties within a geographic area will not by 
itself support a substantial burden claim under RLUIPA.”165 Several courts 
have considered whether enforcing a restriction on land use would cause a 
religious institution to suffer substantial “delay, uncertainty, and expense,” 
but this consideration only takes place after the religious organization pur-
chases the property and faces the prospect of moving to a different loca-
 159.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 532–33. 
 160.  Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 95 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 161.  Irshad Learning Center v. Cty. of DuPage, 804 F. Supp. 2d 697, 699 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 162.  Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 
901 (7th Cir. 2005); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 
2006); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 163.  Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 984-85. 
 164.  Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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tion.166 Courts have generally not considered the impact that the govern-
ment’s actions have on the religious organizations’ budgets.167
The lack of consideration for the financial impact on religious organi-
zations has produced unjust results. In Roman Catholic Bishop of Spring-
field, a church bought a building intending to demolish it and build a new 
facility.168 City residents were not pleased upon learning of the plan, and 
officials designated the building as a historical landmark, protecting it from 
destruction.169 The church could no longer use the property, and it would 
be difficult to sell under the new historic landmark designation. Utilizing 
the direct coercion approach, the court barely considered the costs of pur-
chasing, maintaining, or selling the building, nor did it consider the 
church’s financial viability after the government’s actions.170 The court 
found that no substantial burden existed, noting that “the mere existence of 
some expenses does not put substantial pressure on [the church] to modify 
its behavior.”171
The Supreme Court itself has shown that the financial impact of a 
government regulation should be considered in a substantial burden analy-
sis, as seen in the famed Hobby Lobby v. Burwell case, which was litigated 
under RFRA.172 The Supreme Court noted the enormity of the fines im-
posed on Hobby Lobby if its leaders chose to adhere to their deeply held 
religious beliefs by not providing certain contraceptives to their employ-
ees.173 The fines for their refusal to comply with the government mandate 
amounted to $1.3 million per day, or $475 million per year.174 By compel-
ling the decision between staying faithful to religious beliefs or facing 
fines, the government had substantially burdened the company’s religious 
beliefs. The Court pointed out that if “these consequences do not amount to 
a substantial burden, it is hard to see what would.”175
In the same way, when a religious organization faces a substantial fi-
nancial impact by failing to comply with a land-use restriction, this should 
 166.  Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc., 396 F.3d at 896; Livingston Chris-
tian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996, 1004 (6th Cir. 2017).  
 167.  See Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 
699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983); Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 
691, 709 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
 168.  Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 169.  Id. at 98-99. 
 170.  Id. at 99. 
 171.  Id.
 172.  Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
 173.  Id.
 174.  Id.
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be factored into the court’s substantial burden analysis. However, this is not 
to say that a substantial burden is established merely because a law or poli-
cy makes the free exercise of religion more expensive,176 nor do the multi-
million-dollar fines in Hobby Lobby offer much guidance to the typical 
religious land-use case. However, factoring in the financial impact allows 
the court to consider all the circumstances of the given case. 
One problem with considering financial costs is that the severity of the 
impact is likely to be much greater for a nonprofit religious institution than 
other establishments. This is particularly true for small religious minorities 
in poorer communities. If the financial impact on an institution is given too 
much weight, the Establishment Clause concerns expressed in Part I be-
come an issue.177 In response, a court can fall back to whether cost goes 
beyond what the religious organization could reasonably expect.178 Typical 
costs and delays imposed on to every general land user would not be ex-
empted. However, if the costs go well beyond what can be expected as was 
the case in Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, it is a strong indicator 
that a substantial burden exists. Thus, a proposed factor courts can use may 
be worded as whether the religious institution would suffer substantial de-
lay, uncertainty, and expense beyond what could be reasonably expected. 
D. Self-Imposed Burdens 
If a claimed substantial burden is self-imposed by the plaintiff’s or-
ganization, then this is a strong indicator that no substantial burden ex-
ists.179 A self-imposed burden can occur if an organization purchases a 
property without any reasonable expectation that its use will be permit-
ted.180 For example, in Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News, a Virginia 
town’s zoning code required that “community centers”—such as church-
es—be located more than 100 feet away from residential zones.181 Despite 
knowledge of this zoning requirement, one church bought a property that 
did not comply with the code.182 The zoning authority refused the church’s 
zoning variance application, and the church sued under RLUIPA. The 
Fourth Circuit was not sympathetic to the substantial burden claim. Since 
the church bought the property with knowledge of the zoning issue, the 
 176.  Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 177.  See supra Part I.D (discussing RLUIPA’s relationship with the Establishment Clause). 
 178.  See Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 179.  Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News, Va., 813 F.3d 510, 515 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 180.  Id.
 181.  Id. at 512. 
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hardship was not imposed by governmental action, nor did the government 
alter a legitimate, pre-existing expectation.183 The court held that the plain-
tiffs lacked a reasonable expectation to use the property as a church and 
that any burden on their religious exercise was self-imposed.184
E. Conditional Denial of an Application 
Whether the denial of an application is absolute without the possibility 
of modification and resubmission is also an indicator that a substantial 
burden exists.185 A conditional denial of a building application is likely not 
a substantial burden, since it leaves open the possibility of modification and 
resubmission.186 To determine whether a denial is conditional or absolute, a 
court can look at whether the authority has classified the denial as com-
plete, whether any required modification would itself constitute a burden 
on religious exercise, whether curing the problems specified by the authori-
ty would impose so great an economic burden as to make the change un-
workable, and whether the board’s stated willingness to consider a 
modified proposal is disingenuous.187
CONCLUSION
At the enactment of RLUIPA, a joint bipartisan statement stated that 
“[t]he right to assemble for worship is at the very core of the free exercise 
of religion. Churches and synagogues cannot function without a physical 
space adequate to their needs and consistent with their theological require-
ments. The right to build, buy, or rent such a space is an indispensable ad-
junct of the core First Amendment right to assemble for religious 
purposes.”188
The substantial burden provision of RLUIPA was aimed to protect this 
right and has done so with moderate success. Of the differing approaches 
the courts have put forward, a flexible factor-based analysis has best served 
RLUIPA’s original purpose without being too cumbersome on local gov-
ernments. It allows courts to consider whether religious organizations had 
reasonable expectations when they bought their property, whether they had 
other alternatives, and whether there are signs of discrimination in the land 
 183.  Id. at 515. 
 184.  Id.
 185.  Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 
195 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 186.  Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 187.  Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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regulators’ decision making. The factors proposed by this Note do not con-
stitute an exhaustive list, and there remains an open possibility for new 
factors to be proposed.189 However, by adopting a factor-based analysis, 
courts have the flexibility and certainty to determine what constitutes a 
substantial burden in a given circumstance. 
 189.  See Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 95 (1st Cir. 
2013). 
